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With Weber against Weber: 
 
In Conversation with Pierre Bourdieu1 
 
Pierre Bourdieu, Franz Schultheis, and Andreas Pfeuffer  
 
Translated by Simon Susen2 
 
Question: When did you start to familiarise yourself with the work of Max 
Weber? If I understand you correctly, this happened during your time in 
Algeria. What sort of texts were you reading at that time? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: I began with Die protestantische Ethik. During that time, I was 
working on a book which was intended to summarise my research on Algeria. 
In Die protestantische Ethik there was an abundance of things on the traditional, 
pre-capitalist ‘spirit’, and on economic behaviour – wonderful descriptions 
which were very useful and indeed quite impressive. I drew on Weber’s work 
in order to understand the M’zab, a stretch of land in the Arabic desert, 
inhabited mainly by Kharijites, who are Muslims with a very ascetic – and 
almost ‘Puritan’ – lifestyle and whom we might want to call ‘the Protestants of 
Islam’, a religious current. This was really mind-boggling; this austerity with 
regard to sexual morals and self-discipline. At the same time, these are really 
prosperous and forward-looking traders; in fact, a lot of the small businesses 
in North Africa belong to them. I was astounded by the typically Weberian 
connection between religious asceticism and this very smooth adjustment to 
new conditions. By the way, similar to the Calvinist Puritans, these people are 
highly educated: they read a lot, they read the Qur’an, almost all of the 
children go to school, and most of them are bilingual in Arabic and French. 
Then, in Travail et travailleurs en Algérie, I described the typical Algerian 
merchant; the Moabites were the role model. 
 
Question: Where did you get hold of a copy of  Die protestantische Ethik?  I 
mean, at that time, translations of Weber’s work did not exist in France. 
  
 
Pierre  Bourdieu: There were no translations at all. You  could not even   
find the German editions in the libraries. A friend of mine sent me the book, 
and I started reading it very thoroughly; I learned German and translated 
entire sections. I did not find the French translations, which were published 
later, particularly helpful; it seemed to me that the German text was much 
richer, more precise; the first available translations, especially the one of 
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, conveyed a rather distorted view of 
Weber’s work. 
 
Question: How did you come across Weber’s work? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: That was through Merleau-Ponty’s Les aventures de la 
dialectique, which I found really impressive. This book had a strong impact 
on me in my youth, and I remember there being a brief chapter in which he 
talked about Weber. I think this was the first time I had heard about Weber. 
 
Question: And then, what happened after Algeria? You became an assistant 
to Raymond Aron, who made Weber famous in France, in his own way… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: First, I went to Lille, where I gave this strange kind of 
course on the history of sociological thought: Marx, Durkheim, Weber, 
Pareto – outrageous, an insane job! Then I met Aron; that’s correct. And  
this appreciation of Weber’s  work was something we had in common, until  
I realised that the Weber with whom I was concerned was very different from 
the Weber in whom Aron was interested. I then began to deal with Weber’s 
writings on science at the Sorbonne. 
 
Question: Was this Weber’s Politik als Beruf or his Wissenschaftslehre? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: It was his Wissenschaftslehre. This was him, Aron’s ‘neo-
Kantian’ Weber, preoccupied with the conditions of possibility of 
‘understanding’, and all that kind of stuff. Aron’s entire oeuvre goes into  
this aspect in great detail; but, in those days, this was quite natural, given the 
omnipresence of the rationalist tradition in French philosophy and given that 
Aron was one of Brunschvicg’s students; this was his Weber. He hardly knew 
Weber’s Religionssoziologie or his Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. I had already 
studied, and partly translated, these writings during my time at Lille: the 
introduction to Die protestantische Ethik, some sections of the Wissenschaftslehre, 
and also a few sections from Weber’s Religionssoziologie. In any case, it soon 
became clear to me that Aron and I had very different ways of looking at 
things: my Weber was opposed to Aron’s Weber. It is staggering that Aron was 
hardly familiar at all with Weber’s Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
  
 
Question: As a foreign observer, one sometimes gets the impression that 
there were two ‘Webers’, two logics of reception: one conservative Weber, 
who had already been introduced by Aron; perhaps this is a bit exaggerated, 
but a Weber ‘against’ Durkheim. Anyhow, Weber seems to have made more of 
an impression than Durkheim. How was it possible that Durkheim had been 
so easily eclipsed by this interpretation of Weber? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: It is not easy to explain this, at least not if one forgets the 
struggles that were taking place in the French intellectual field at the time. 
With regard to Durkheim, I am under the impression that behind Weber   
one senses the full weight of German philosophy: Kant and others. Weber,  
in this respect, appears to be much more  ‘aristocratic’  than  Durkheim,  
who has always been stigmatised as a ‘positivist’. Weber was much more 
attractive. In Weber  there is ‘charisma’, there is a ‘difference’; Durkheim    
is about ‘ethnology’, ‘the primitive’. Weber wrote about ‘world religions’, 
‘advanced civilisations’, ‘charisma’, and ‘manna’ – a contrast which may have 
contributed to the fact that Weber is the more inspiring thinker. Weber is less 
‘schoolmasterly’, less ‘prosaic’. 
And then we must not forget that, after the Second World War, existentialism 
and phenomenology began to develop a tremendous power: Sartre, and 
everything that came after him; a return to ‘authenticity’, which was opposed 
to – rationalistically inspired – scholastic philosophy and which at the same 
time brought, with Sartre, a model of the intellectual into play which has 
had, and continues to have, an effect until the present day; a certain radical 
chic that coincided with the rediscovery of Hegel and Marx and, hence, with a 
spectacular expansion of Marxism. 
If  Weber  used to be stigmatised as a ‘conservative’, then in the sense    
of a thinker whose work was referred to by the orthodoxy at the time: the 
‘methodological individualist’, the ‘bourgeois philosophy’. Their complete 
ignorance of his oeuvre never prevented French intellectuals from condemning 
Weber. In support of Marx, one saw in Weber – who says somewhere that 
whenever he deals with the primacy of ‘the economic’ he considers himself 
a Marxist – the advocate of a spiritualist philosophy of history. Of course, this 
interpretation was based on a simplistic reading of Die protestantische Ethik. If 
the orthodoxy referred exclusively to his Wissenschaftslehre, then what was left 
of Weber? 
For the philosophers of ‘existence’, he was ‘only’ a sociologist. It was 
clear that amongst Marxists, and many believed to be Marxist at the time, 
Weber was completely impossible. I remember having conversations – in the 
early and mid 1960s – in which I often said that it would be barely possible 
to do sociology without any knowledge of Weber;  although  this  would 
then be recognised on every occasion – ‘yes, sure; Weber is tremendously
  
 
important’ –, when one would try to discuss Weber in a more serious manner, 
it would soon become apparent that people hardly knew anything about     
his work. Even Althusser confirmed this when acknowledging that Weber 
was not taken seriously by Marxists and when confessing that he himself 
had not read Weber’s work. Weber was perceived as ‘right-wing’. Obviously, 
because it was Aron who had made him famous in France, not because        
of  the things that Weber  had said himself. That made me mad, given that    
it had been precisely his marvellous observations that had enchanted me.      
I said to myself: ‘I am not right-wing; Weber is simply good!’ 
 
Question: Time and again, the struggles that took place in the intellectual 
field during that period – between the academic, the traditionally rationalist 
orthodoxy, on the one hand, and the ‘existentialist’, intellectual avant-garde, 
on the other – sought to provoke people into political confessions. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu:  And   yet,   these  were   utterly  artificial  oppositions.  I 
believe it is possible to think with a thinker and to think, at the same  time, 
against him or her. This means that, in a radical way, we have to challenge 
the classificatory, and hence political, logic in which – almost everywhere – 
relations with the thoughts of the past are established. ‘For Marx’, as 
Althusser wanted it to be, or ‘against Marx’. I am convinced that it is 
possible to think with Marx against Marx, or with Durkheim against 
Durkheim; and surely also with Marx and Durkheim against Weber, and 
vice versa. It is not because I have a proclivity for the paradoxical that I 
want to suggest that Weber accomplished Marxist purposes where Marx 
was unable to redeem them. This is particularly true with regard to the 
sociology of religion, which is certainly not one of Marx’s strengths. Weber, 
in this respect, develops a genuine ‘Political Economy of Religion’, an 
astonishingly materialist view of the phenomenon, but without wanting to 
deprive it of its curious symbolic nature. When he says, for instance, that the 
Church presents itself as the ‘monopoly’ of legitimate distribution of 
‘sacred goods’, he provides us with extraordinarily valuable insights which 
go far beyond a reductive economistic imaginary. 
 
Question: And the ‘right-wing’ orthodoxy…? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: When I wrote my first article on Weber’s sociology of 
religion for the Archives européennes de sociologie, I encountered a few difficulties. It 
was closely related to the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, and there 
was a sort of fetishism about the ‘great’ thinker Weber. The editorial board 
consisted of eminent people like Aron, Crozier, and Dahrendorf, but I was not
  
 
a member. It was quite a conservative journal. And I had my article; Aron, 
however, said to me: ‘There is no way you can publish it like this. I really do 
not agree with it.’ In fact, he said I would convert Weber into a ‘lefty’. I replied 
that when I talk about ‘the theodicy of privilege’ it is not me but Weber who 
is talking and that everything which appears in inverted commas is Weber’s, 
rather than my, voice. All I had done was to call things, which people refused 
to take into account, by their real names! Eventually, Aron let the article pass; 
and some time after its publication I received a long and enthusiastic letter 
from Randall Collins, in which he wrote that I had wrenched Weber from  
the conservatives, that I had presented a much more genuine Weber, and that 
this was extremely important for sociology. By the way, Aron allowed me to 
teach – primarily – Durkheim, but never Weber, when I would have preferred 
to give lectures on Weber…! 
 
Question: …subsuming Weber under the title ‘sociology of domination’, in 
the broadest sense… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: …yes, that’s exactly right… 
 
Question: …you identify with this notion. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: Yes, of course. Why shouldn’t I? Back then, in Lille, I gave 
this course on ‘From Marx to Durkheim, Pareto, and Weber’; again and again 
in relation to Marx. Without wanting to overemphasise this point here, it seems 
to me that the foundational call for all these thinkers came from Marx. 
 
Question: If we take Durkheim and Weber, who deliberately ignored one 
another: there is no doubt that there are a lot of commonalities between them; 
in both cases, for example, religion was a primary concern. How do you see this 
key role which the sociology of religion plays with regard to the birth of sociology 
in general? The social sciences come into existence when the ‘disenchantment’ 
of the world becomes evident… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: There are a lot of connections here, but let me reiterate  
this point; there is something which, at least in Weber, one can see very 
clearly – and this is what has impressed me the most: the reference to Marx. 
Weber seeks to close one of the gaps in Marxism. In Die protestantische Ethik 
he asserts, roughly speaking, that he does not claim that his work explains 
everything, but that it is only aimed at rectifying a picture which Marxism had 
painted in a somewhat reductive fashion. In essence, Weber is concerned with 
retrieving the symbolic dimension of social life – not as the primary and ultimate
  
 
dimension, but as a dimension which deserves its legitimate place in history. 
Not least because of this, religion plays such a pivotal role: religion as ‘the 
symbolic’ par excellence. Weber explores ‘the symbolic’; in fact, he has a try at a 
materialist theory of ‘the symbolic’. 
 
Question: It seems to me that we have now reached a point where you can 
maybe explain a bit further what lies at the heart of your own works in the 
sociology of religion. Obviously, Weber is of huge importance in this respect; 
and the article that you wrote for the Archives européennes de sociologie focused on 
Weber’s sociology of religion. In your second work on religion you used the 
concept of ‘field’, in some detail, for the first time. Was Weber some kind of 
‘stepping stone’ for this project? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: I got to know Weber’s work in Algeria. I found many 
things in Die protestantische Ethik which helped me to understand such traditional 
societies. When I returned from Algeria, Weber was somebody who had 
already caught my attention; and then I started to teach Weber’s  sociology  
of religion based on his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. I remember that, during the 
course, everything just fell into place when covering and comparing different 
religious ‘occupations’: the priest, the prophet, the sorcerer,  and the laity.      
I then drew a diagram on the blackboard and tried to capture the relations 
between them. What does the priest do with the sorcerer and with the prophet? 
He excommunicates them. What does the prophet do with the priest? He 
threatens him with the power of ‘extraordinariness’. Quickly this became a 
model of interactions, which seemed very plausible: it was the relations between 
them which defined the respective ‘types’. 
In a way, Weber had certainly been the main source of inspiration for this 
whole scheme. Previously, I had run a seminar at the École Normale, which 
focused on the literary field. At that time, I had already used the concept     
of ‘field’, which allowed me to get a grip on some of the difficulties. What 
came out of this seminar was my article Champ littéraire et projet créateur, which 
was published in Temps modernes in a number on structuralism, although – 
ultimately – this article had not really been ‘structuralist’ at all. It was not until 
later that, during my course on Weber’s sociology of religion, the scales fell 
from my eyes: we cannot make sense of this in interactionist terms, because 
we are dealing with objective relations – that is, objective structures – which form 
the base line for the ‘typical’ behaviour of the participants. After this, when I 
read Weber’s Das antike Judentum, everything became more obvious. During 
that period, I developed my first work on the sociology of religion; it was a 
certain rupture, an improvement compared to the first attempt, which I had 
made in Champ littéraire. 
  
 
Question: Did the concept of ‘habitus’ play a decisive role in this process? 
 
Pierre  Bourdieu: Not really; the concept already exists in the works of      
all the great sociologists: in Durkheim, in Mauss…fair enough, in Weber,  
the concept is not particularly well developed, but on the other hand in his 
work you can find immensely powerful descriptions, especially with regard 
to traditional economic attitudes. For my study of Algeria, this was a real 
treasure chest. 
 
Question: But was Weber your source of inspiration for the development of 
the concept of ‘field’? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: Not quite. Starting from Weber, the concept of ‘field’ had 
to be turned against – and indeed go beyond – Weber, in order to cope with 
the difficulty of explaining ‘typical’ – mutually related – forms of behaviour, 
which can consolidate themselves without real ‘interactions’. In Weber, this 
concept does not really exist; what does exist in his work, however, are these 
insightful ‘personality and life order studies’; and at the end of every section 
in his Religionssoziologie you can find an outline of the relations between 
‘occupations’, not in a ‘structuralist’ way, but… 
 
Question: …an inspiration… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: …without any doubt. I have always found Weber inspiring 
and important. Yet, my work has, from the start, dealt with all sorts of different 
‘sources’. When I am asked about the development of my work, I cannot 
overemphasise this point. It is very common to reduce ‘Bourdieusian thought’ 
to a few key terms, and usually even just a few book titles, and this then leads 
to a kind of closure: ‘reproduction’, ‘distinction’, ‘capital’, and ‘habitus’ – all 
of these terms are often used in misleading ways, without really understanding 
what they stand for, and hence they become slogans. In reality, however, these 
concepts – these frameworks – are only principles for scientific work, which is 
usually of mere practical nature; they are synthetic or synoptic notions, which 
serve to provide research programmes with scientific orientations. 
At the end of the day, the important thing is the research itself, that is, the 
research on the subject matter itself. To be sure, one does have to treat these 
things carefully; but, when dealing with these concepts, one cannot make any 
progress without a respectful sense of freedom. I constantly try to improve my work. 
Often, this is perceived as a form of endless repetition; for me, by contrast, 
these are often tremendously important changes, no matter how insignificant 
they may appear at first sight. 
  
 
As far as the ‘sources’ are concerned, people  may  be  surprised  by this, 
but I really proceed eclectically in this regard: I am engaged in reflexive 
eclecticism. For me, it is not necessarily a contradiction to ‘borrow’ stuff 
from everywhere: from Marx to Durkheim via Weber, as long as all this 
leads to a certain  theoretical  coherence,  which  nowadays  is  castigated as 
‘totalitarian’ by the postmodernists. Besides, this ‘eclecticism’ is not 
tantamount to randomness. If, for example, we look at Norbert Elias, it 
seems to me that he is subject to excessive interpretation by a number       
of people, precisely because it is not sufficiently clear how much this 
thinker owes to other thinkers, in particular to Weber. In  fact, a  lot  in 
Elias is simply a commentary on Weber, and nevertheless this all remains 
very stimulating. 
There is hardly  any  study  by  myself  that  does  not  owe  something,  
in one way or another, to others; but of course this does not mean that, 
consequently, nothing has been accomplished. One of  the merits for which  
I really give myself credit is the attempt to shed light on the extent to which 
these theoretical debates, which often lead to a regrettable barrenness in 
science, are based on socially ‘constructed’ oppositions. In this regard, 
Bachelard used to talk about ‘epistemological pairs’, which cannot exist 
independently from one another, but which at the same time impede genuine 
scientific progress. The opposition between Marx and Weber,  for example,  
is usually a rather artificial one, and there is no reason why their respective 
contributions should not be subject to cross-fertilisation. The same applies  
to Durkheim and Weber. We need this conceptual integration, which every 
forward-looking science is capable of producing. 
 
Question: Let’s continue with these three figures: Marx, Durkheim, and 
Weber. Where do you see their main contributions that have allowed you to 
make progress in your sociology of religion and, based on it, your conception 
of ‘the field’? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: As I have already mentioned, religion is certainly not the 
forte of the Marxian oeuvre, and generally of the materialist approach, with 
which Weber took issue. In Weber, the line of attack is in another direction. 
Here, religion is the realm in which – more than in any other realm – both 
the approach and the aspiration of sociology can be illustrated, where what is 
seemingly most widely separated can be brought together, ‘the material’ and 
‘the symbolic’, the correspondence of social and mental structures, collective 
representations – and, eventually, in Weber. In Die protestantische Ethik, Weber is 
primarily concerned with salvaging ‘the symbolic’ for a materialist conception 
of history; and his Religionssoziologie is an exemplary way of bringing the
  
 
concrete forms of ‘religious labour’ together. At some points, they are even  
a bit too concrete, but precisely the juxtaposition between these ‘types’ 
demonstrates very vividly what we are actually dealing with: the stakes in the 
struggles over the monopoly of the legitimate power over the sacred goods . To be clear 
about this: it is precisely Weber’s concrete, sometimes brutal, materialism – 
that is, his break with the illusio – which is so incredibly insightful. 
 
Question: Thus, Durkheim and Weber  uncover – each in their own way,      
in the realm of ideas, which seems to be so ‘removed’ from the world – the 
‘worldly’ conditionality of our thoughts and actions. Does the religious field 
lend itself so well to sociology also because it constitutes a realm in which the 
leap from ‘the material’ to ‘the symbolic’ – to a ‘theodicy of the conditions of 
existence’ – occurs in such a pure, original form? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: Of course, in this sense it is very useful. What one sees 
here is the primitive form of capital accumulation or, if you like, of the 
accumulation of symbolic capital. I think this is the way in which capital 
begins to accumulate, initially in its symbolic form, and eventually in order to 
be converted into other ‘types’ of capital. This is also the start of the conflicts 
which then become essential to a given field… 
 
Question: …and which consequently absorb other relations of domination. 
If one conceives of ‘the sacred’ and ‘the profane’ in terms of an opposition, it 
seems that this ‘classical’ antagonism crops up again and again in your works 
on particular fields of cultural production…a continuous semantics… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: It is true that the religious field provides us with the 
heuristic model par excellence to make sense of these relations – as a kind of 
realised ‘ideal type’ of the field. I remember that, during my studies on Weber, 
I stumbled across a book at some friends’ place. They possessed an old library, 
where I saw this book: a ‘guide’ through Paris, composed of texts by famous 
French authors, introduced by Hugo. There was a chapter in it by Sainte- 
Beuve about the academies; and it said that the academies are like the Church 
and the prophets, a metaphor, people spontaneously use these metaphors. It 
talked about the ‘incrustation’ of these things, of ‘everydayness’. This contrast 
is very powerful, in the struggles of art, politics; and, although it is not always 
elaborated, it is omnipresent. 
 
Question: Does this also mean that in religion we are confronted with a 
substantive paradigm? To be exact, how do you conceive of the ‘subject 
matter’ religion? Where does religion originate? Is there such a thing as a
  
 
religious need, about which Schleiermacher used to talk? Is there such a thing 
as a ‘will to faith’, some sort of anthropological predisposition? 
 
Pierre  Bourdieu: I wrote something about this in my second contribution  
to the religious field. This is obviously not a simple issue, but the question   
is whether or not an answer to this problem is actually of any significance. 
What came first? The need, or the world which – after all, in its own way and 
in its own order – implants this need in us? I am satisfied with the Weberian 
definition: religion is a systematic answer to the question of life and death. 
Actually, this is a beautiful definition. To be sure, there are ‘existential’ 
questions that oblige us to reflect upon the ‘transcendental’ – and, hence,  
the collective – conditions of the transcendental: questions about life and 
death; the death of people whom we love; ‘ultimate’ questions; illness, human 
suffering. These are all questions that people never manage to answer on their 
own. Religion gives systematic answers to these questions – or rather quasi- 
systematic answers, because they are not systematic as, for example, in logic. 
Religion gives coherence to the ‘discontinuous’ events of our life; it bestows 
abstract contingence with concrete coherence; in this respect, it resembles 
philosophy, a ‘total’ explanation of the world… 
 
Question: …which is smashed to pieces under the ‘dull compulsion’ as we 
know it today…in this regard, Weber is more radical than Marx… 
 
Pierre  Bourdieu: …and he is right! In Algeria this became very clear to  
me: people who lived in a religious universe, and who were unexpectedly 
confronted with an economic universe; all of a sudden they had to resolve 
ineluctably difficult questions, questions to which religion provided ready 
answers. ‘Should I wear a tie?’ ‘And, if I wear one, do I subjugate myself to the 
colonisers?’ Or the haircut: ‘If I choose the imported haircut, do I then look 
like somebody “from yesterday”?’ In this respect, the Turkish haircut was a 
solution; since Ataturk, the Turks belonged to the ‘modern people’; and, at the 
same time, it was in accordance with Islamic tradition – although, at the end 
of the day, in such a historical setting everything causes difficulties, everything 
becomes a problem… 
 
Question: …the contact with a foreign culture… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: …exactly. Everything seems to indicate that the great 
philosophical revolutions emerged out of such situations; in the Greek 
societies, the big controversies over what is determined by nature or law;  
this comes to the surface when people – ultimately, tribes, which have different
  
 
laws – encounter one another. If some do certain things in one way, and others 
do these things in another way, then you start having doubts: it does not have 
to be – that is, it is not necessarily – like this or like that. I have seen societies 
in which all of the behavioural patterns were consecrated by the power of 
truth; and suddenly others arrive who do it not only differently, but who do 
not even have an idea of how ‘true’ this is. Traditional societies have no idea 
of other traditions. 
 
Question: Like us… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: Like us; there are things that hardly change. Yet, when you 
suddenly encounter people whose behaviour and ‘self-ordering’ are different, 
then the philosophers emerge: there are those who say ‘no, it must remain as 
it was’ and others who say ‘no, this is true’. This is the origin of philosophy. In 
these situations, religions are very important, because they tell you what needs 
to be done and how it needs to be done: a selective practice that permeates 
even the smallest things, which then acquire an overriding importance. If you 
do not wear a head covering, you run the risk of being beaten to death, and 
this is not an anecdote… 
 
Question: …because one facilitates the cultivation of a kind of ‘sociological 
awareness’. One drags religious symbols, which have an abstract nature,  
into the light of social relations and thereby makes sense of them within a 
‘sociological’ framework. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: Exactly. Maybe this definition is a bit reductive, but I have 
described religion as relations of feelings, which have to be experienced, and of 
meanings, which do have meaning. In Algeria this was better than living with 
the agony of having to be ‘experienced’… 
 
Question: …a theodicy of ‘the negatively privileged’. It is even more astonishing 
that this dimension of domination, which is omnipresent in Weber’s work, has 
hardly contributed to a ‘left-wing’ – i.e. a critical – reading of Weber. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: Perhaps this is because, as a ‘foreigner’, I had fewer 
reservations. The dance of the autochthons for their great ancestors is 
performed with much more doggedness, but I am not an exegete. I did not 
want to say what ‘the truth’ is about Weber.  This is not my job; I conceive  
of myself as a researcher; I search for ‘food for thought’, for research ‘tools’. 
Weber may well have said a few stupidities, but what I read of him was rather 
insightful. Or, for example, Simmel, who is perhaps not a ‘great’ thinker, but
  
 
there are some thrilling and powerful elements in his work, some reflexive 
devices; I gladly accept such propositions…as long as the person was not a 
monster. I have been told that Weber was a conservative; this, however, has 
not particularly impressed me. What I read by him – for instance, his work on 
the East Elbian peasants – had been written in a context which might have 
given rise to a ‘conservative’ reading of his work. Yet, against the background 
of political history, it seemed rather progressive. I was not very familiar with 
these things at the time; this was not my history. Had I been German, this 
might have been different: I would have been in a better position to judge 
Weber’s role in the academic world and in the political world. But never mind, 
this gave me a sense of freedom to which many German sociologists were not 
entitled. In addition, when – after a few years – I returned from Algeria, I was 
even a bit of a stranger myself in France: the classificatory fervour, with which 
the struggles within the intellectual field were fought there, this was – after 
everything I had experienced – incomprehensible. 
Another aspect which has always impressed me about Weber is the fact 
that he granted himself incredible liberties in relation to the scholarly world. 
In Wissenschaft als Beruf, Max Weber said some extraordinary things of an 
almost brutal sincerity. When I was selected by the CNRS to be honoured  
for my work, I quoted a few sentences from Weber in my speech – sentences 
which were quite fierce. After this event, some people told me: ‘What you 
have just poured out there is unbelievable. You cannot say this sort of thing 
in the presence of all the dignitaries, of the ministers, of the director of the 
École Normale, of the Collège de France’ – in the presence of all of my colleagues! 
Phrases of such ruthless and brutal candour! It is mindboggling that Weber 
really said these things at the time. The scholarly world is full of people who 
behave like revolutionaries when they deal with things that do not concern them 
directly and like conservatives when they have a personal stake in the matter. 
In any case, I was fully invested in these lectures, and I delivered them with 
passion. In former times, I was not very familiar with the cultural background. 
It was not until I started to engage with the work of Heidegger that a lot of 
these things became clear to me. It was easier for me to understand what it 
actually meant to say these things at the time, and I admire Weber more and 
more for that reason, as he was really very courageous. 
 
Question: Weber used to say a lot of  things against his own ‘status group’… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: …tremendously radical. Often one is called ‘right-wing’ 
when one says the truth about the ‘left’. I have already suggested some time 
ago that intellectuals are the dominated stratum amongst the dominant 
groups; but this was inconceivable, because intellectuals were regarded as ‘out
  
 
of the game’, ‘sublime’, ‘free’, ‘disinterested’, ‘creative’ – anything you want. 
Maybe this explains the label of the ‘right-winger’. Weber says things about 
intellectuals…but what is ‘conservative’ in his writings? 
 
Question: The ‘context’ played a much less significant role in the reception 
of Nietzsche in France; quite the opposite… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: What applies to Durkheim in relation to Weber also 
applies to the perception of the relation between Weber and Nietzsche. The 
latter is much more suitable for grandiose philosophical platitudes than the 
former. If the epistemological meta-discourse, which has also been forced 
upon Weber, has for a long time – maybe up to the present day – obscured 
scientific practice (such as Weber’s extraordinary effort to provide an outline 
of a historical sociology or sociological history of religion, the economy, and 
law), then Weber’s ‘charisma’, this ‘miracle’ of the German University, stands 
behind the philosophical autodidact Nietzsche. Nietzsche is engulfed by the 
radical chic – by the way, in France even more so than in Germany itself. Weber, 
who has been – not only for me – a sort of intellectual shock, has had such a 
tremendous impact because what lingers behind his fundamental questions is 
a whole universe of worldwide knowledge about all kinds of cultures. Weber is 
the incarnation of comparative method, with all its array of social premises. In 
any case, Weber refers to reflexive scientific practice – an exercise with which 
French post-war philosophy refused to engage. You could draw on Hegel’s 
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts or on Nietzsche’s Genealogie der Moral, but on 
Weber? And all this despite the fact that, in more than one respect, Weber goes 
far beyond these works… 
 
Question: …maybe this is yet another issue concerning the relationship 
between Weber and Nietzsche. Recently, there have been a number  of 
studies which have presented Weber much more definitely against this 
background, against this ‘mood of the time’, which was not least shaped by 
Hegel. The impression that Nietzsche made on Weber seems rather essential 
in this respect. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: Weber and Nietzsche share a number of views and 
opinions. Of course, there are also some objective connections. What I have 
in mind, for instance, is Nietzsche’s philosophy of resentment – which is, by 
the way, itself nourished by resentment – but also the way in which Weber 
describes the religions of redemption: all those things about ‘the feeling of 
dignity’, ‘the way of life’, most likely perhaps the whole vocabulary about 
power, of struggle, ‘the heroic’. Yet, one should not allow oneself to be
  
 
deceived by all this, by the commonality of ‘attitude’. In Weber, this is all 
much more thought out, more organised, more saturated. In Nietzsche, by 
contrast, the concept of power is so shapeless and vague. In Weber’s Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft there is a section in which, when putting forward his concept 
of ‘domination’, he discards the concept of power, which – as he sees it – is of 
no use for a sharp sociological concept formation… 
 
Question: …as a ‘spontaneous sociologist’, however, Nietzsche is quite 
remarkable… 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: …and yet, this is precisely what has never really impressed 
the Nietzscheans – at least not in France. I remember a conversation with 
Foucault in which he tried to identify the main sources of his own intellectual 
passions – in his search for a way out of the cul-de-sac of traditional 
philosophy. For him, the great shock was caused by Nietzsche’s Genealogie der 
Moral. In my case, this was not the same: I had different inclinations, which 
were derived from Weber and Durkheim. To be sure, it is possible to read 
Nietzsche in a ‘positivist’ way, as a moral sociology, but to me this seemed to be 
too limited, very intuitive. This sort of thing had much more of an ‘impact’ on 
the philosophers; Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger. There were not many 
philosophers who remained unimpressed by this. I found Merleau-Ponty more 
inspiring; and, in his work, Weber was not presented as an ‘epistemologist’ or 
as an ‘interpretive’ sociologist. The whole phenomenological obscurantism; 
Sartre and existentialism; the heroic aesthetics in Nietzsche; the salvation of a 
philosophy of the subject – I have always found all of this quite dumb. I have 
never really been on this trip. For me, Weber is about science, and in the best 
sense of the term! 
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